

**NOTE TO:**

**Mr Riza,**  
**Mr Malloch Brown,**  
**Mr Egeland,**  
**Ms Bertini,**  
**Mr Prendergast,**  
**Mr Ramcharan**

I enclose my end-of-assignment report from Sudan, addressed jointly to all concerned with the different functions that I was privileged to discharge there as UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator (from 2 March 2003 till 1 April 2004). It was an honour to serve, and I am grateful for the opportunity and support.

The report is self- explanatory and, now, largely for the historical record. But there are a few observations on lessons and wider implications of approaches tried that may be of system-wide interest. Only one further comment: latterly and very necessarily, the focus has had to be on Darfur. But there were also other important issues, including where there has been positive progress in Sudan, as recognised in the report.

30 May 2004

Mukesh Kapila

Cc Sudan ITF, New York  
UN Sudan Country Team

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OFFICE OF UN RESIDENT AND HUMANITARIAN CO-ORDINATOR  
FOR THE SUDAN

A Review of Assistance for the Sudan in 2003-2004: meeting humanitarian needs, promoting human rights, supporting the transition towards peace and recovery, and renewing United Nations effectiveness at country level

**End of Assignment Report :**

***Dr Mukesh Kapila,***

***UN Resident & Humanitarian Coordinator for the Sudan (March 2003 - April 2004)***

## INTRODUCTION

1. This report sets out the major developments that took place in the Sudan during my tenure as UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator<sup>1</sup> covering a period of 13 months, from 2 March 2003 till 1 April 2004. This is mostly a factual overview of the major assistance provided through the United Nations system and perceptions of key impact achieved. It includes, where relevant, some personal reflections on lessons learnt and the possible wider implications of organisational innovations attempted in the process of 'strengthening' the UN at country-level, aimed at boosting its effectiveness, efficiency, and credibility.

## OVERVIEW

2. Ongoing conflict and recurrent natural calamities, as well as poor governance, grossly impaired human rights and social and human development, have continued to be the principal causes of the plight of the Sudanese people. In addition to the estimated two million deaths directly attributed to the fighting between the Government of the Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), four million have been displaced. Several million more have suffered from the associated disruption of their livelihoods and lack of basic services. The past year has seen useful progress made on humanitarian assistance provision, some limited recovery and rehabilitation, and a start to post-conflict planning. But these were hard-won and continued constraints to full and free access, and fitful co-operation between the conflicting parties, remained one of our major challenges.

3. Any overall gain in Sudan was also largely cancelled by the rapid unfolding of the world's greatest current humanitarian and human rights catastrophe - in the Greater Darfur Region of Western Sudan. At least 1.2 million people<sup>2</sup> were directly affected by the conflict in the region of which some 850,000 had to flee their homes. The violence against civilians in Darfur reached the extent to be characterised as ethnic cleansing, including the conduct of war crimes, and crimes against humanity. These are described in our separate report<sup>3</sup> prepared for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.

4. The Sudan is, thus, at a critical stage in its long and troubled history. The prospect of a comprehensive agreement between the Government of the Sudan (GoS) and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) has brought hope that this will bring real changes in people's day-to-day lives. But overall peace and stability in the country cannot occur without a just resolution of the Darfur conflict.

5. The UN will continue to be tested on the effectiveness of its contribution to peace-making, peace-keeping, and peace-building in the Sudan. The UN in the Sudan enjoys greater credibility and respect now, than before, reflected in the approximately 50% increase in donor resourcing in 2003 compared to the previous year. Useful foundations have been laid on a post-peace agreement role for the UN, not least through the changes at the level of the UN Country Team, based on the principle of a *one-UN* approach. But UN reform efforts (at the country level, *where they really matter*) need to be sustained - driven by incentives and HQ leadership that influences organisational behaviour appropriately, as well as a vision that inspires both humanitarian and development sides to make common cause in a shared

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<sup>1</sup> And UN Designated Official for Security, UNDP Resident Representative, OCHA Representative, Director of the UN Information Centre, and Head of Operation Lifeline Sudan. *UN entities active in the Sudan in 2003-2004 were: UNDP, WFP, UNICEF, FAO, WHO, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNMAS, OCHA, OHCHR, UNSECOORD, and UNIC. IOM and the World Bank were also associated with the UN system.*

<sup>2</sup> All figures and statistics in this report are as at early April 2004

<sup>3</sup> Report to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (April 2004): *Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan: Violations of Human Rights in the Greater Darfur Region, covering the period from 1 April 2003 to 31 March 2004.*

assistance endeavour. We sought to do this by promoting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as the unifying vision.

## THE VISION

6. The starting point was to agree in the UN Country Team a common framework for the assistance efforts of UN Sudan, with the shared **purpose** to promote a peaceful environment allowing the fulfilment of the rights of the Sudanese people to survival and protection, as well as their ability to exercise informed choices, and to enjoy equal dignity and development.

7. The principal **objectives** underpinning the design and delivery of UN assistance were intended to:

- a. Promote systems ensuring the respect, protection and advancement of human rights by all authorities;
- b. Promote good governance by strengthening macro and local level conflict resolution mechanisms;
- c. Save lives, and reduce suffering and deprivation among populations affected by conflict and natural disasters, through humanitarian assistance;
- d. Encourage an integrated and holistic approach, at all levels, to build pro-peace capacities and coalitions;
- e. Encourage sustainable solutions to the problem of severe inequality, and address needs of marginalized groups, including the internally displaced and refugees;
- f. Help consolidate peace through quick impact and longer term measures targeted at conflict impacted populations and geographical areas, thereby providing incentives to create community confidence and maintain peace (special consideration will be given to tribal structures, inter-tribal and intra-tribal dynamics to ensure that the dividends of peace accrue to all parties, and to avoid new rivalries susceptible to threaten peace);
- g. Mainstream gender concerns, and promote the empowerment of women in all policies, programmes and individual projects;
- h. Promote life sustaining interventions in order to protect livelihoods and prepare the ground for longer term sustainable development;
- i. Improve the provision of basic services, and the construction, repair and reconstruction of public infrastructure.

8. The main challenge faced was the polarised debate between the humanitarian and development sides of assistance which had, over time, become institutionalised into structures and systems which did not reflect the evolving complexity of Sudan. Hence, we adopted the MDGs to provide a common set of specific and measurable objectives, targets and indicators that have the added advantage that they enjoy global endorsement. From the MDGs perspective, both humanitarian and development assistance seek to achieve the same ultimate outcomes in terms of human survival, welfare, and progress, the difference being on the methods<sup>4</sup> necessary to tackle the special difficulties and constraints of crisis and conflict situations.

9. The MDG orientation was initially received with scepticism by the humanitarian members of the UN Sudan family - indicating the need for wider sensitisation. But this philosophy was eventually reflected in the *Consolidated Appeal for the Sudan Assistance Programme for 2004 (ASAP)* that outlined the assistance community's humanitarian and transitional agenda.<sup>5</sup> The ASAP, which was developed in consultation with Sudanese counterparts and other stakeholders, marked a departure from previous Consolidated Appeals for the Sudan, in providing a comprehensive overview of the Sudan's requirements for immediate assistance, based on MDG outcomes, and covering the full range of interventions across the assistance spectrum:

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<sup>4</sup> For example, civilian protection is of special concern in humanitarian work in conflicts, and institution or capacity building is central to development work.

<sup>5</sup> The ASAP is available in print in English in two volumes, on CD-ROM and can be downloaded from [www.unsudanig.org](http://www.unsudanig.org). The Arabic translation of volume 1 is also available.

- increasing **humanitarian action** and **quick start/peace impact** initiatives;
- capitalizing on the opportunities to support **capacity building** in support of transitional recovery;
- Achieving progress on the **human rights, governance and peacebuilding** tenets of the Millennium Declaration, without which the MDGs cannot be attained.

10. In practical terms, the ASAP included two principal components: **humanitarian action and transitional recovery**. **Humanitarian interventions** sought to provide immediate life-saving and life-sustaining assistance to populations affected by conflicts and natural disasters, along with international protection measures. **Transitional recovery** interventions were aimed at enabling communities to tackle the underlying causes of conflict and to establish the social, economic and governance foundations for longer-term sustainable development. These two components needed to be accompanied by specific efforts designed to meet expectations of “peace dividends”, as well as strengthening Sudanese participation and capacity.

11. There are some wider implications of this approach. First, this concept of bridging the relief-development gap provides a way to build on the substantive strengths of both humanitarian and development sides: transition arrangements should rise above traditional rivalries within the international assistance system that have to be mediated through complex organisational structures that have so high transaction costs. Second, it questions the traditional view that development assistance can be given only when countries have graduated out of conflict and crisis. Until then, they must be satisfied with humanitarian relief. Arguably, this has not helped in the Sudan where human development and human rights might have been more advanced today (despite situations such as Darfur), if a more enlightened policy of engagement on development issues had been initiated at an earlier stage. To link human development (a basic human right) to political change is arguably as unethical as doing the same in relation to humanitarian action (another basic human right). The risk of inadvertently strengthening oppressive and inefficient state institutions through development assistance - in a context of poor governance - may be mitigated by focusing on human capacity building and livelihoods generation, as opposed to bureaucratic institutional capacity building.

## DELIVERY IN PRACTICE

12. Encouraging developments in the peace process between GoS and SPLM were paralleled by the main achievement of the assistance community to **help an additional one million vulnerable people** in 2003. This was enabled by greater contact between the two sides, assisted by the new *Tripartite Working Groups on Access and Cross-line Activities, and Humanitarian Cooperation*, facilitated by the RC/HC. These brought together the GOS and SPLM to discuss common concerns such as policy on IDPs. Practical outcomes included the first cross-line activities for some years with two cross-line barge operations delivering assistance along the Nile to an additional 500,000 beneficiaries at an estimated saving in delivery costs of \$240 per metric tonne when compared to airdrops. The lasting agreement on cross-line cooperation in the Nuba Mountains also allowed the delivery of food, seeds and tools; joint training of deminers and animal health workers; and agricultural rehabilitation.

13. The **overall access situation** fluctuated during the year, with progress in many areas, and setbacks in others. Delays in obtaining travel permits for humanitarian personnel remained the principal challenge. Apart from large parts of the Darfur region, Hamesh Koreb in Kassala State remained completely inaccessible.

14. In mitigating the effects of extreme poverty and hunger, **food aid** helped 3.4 million vulnerable people in 2003, and a further 2.5 million people since the start of 2004. In support of longer-term **food security**, 1.8 million people were also assisted with non-food inputs over the past year. In addition, efforts were directed to reduce dependence on relief: food-for-work, food-for-training, supplementary feeding, institutional feeding and school feeding programmes complemented general food distributions. These helped to create sustainable assets and

livelihoods for many local communities, including for some 85,000 **refugees enabled to return home** in 2003, mostly to Eritrea. The gains from more timely and well-distributed rainfall during the agricultural season were partially offset by severe flooding in parts of Equatoria, Bahr El Ghazal and Upper Nile. Progress was also notable in the **livestock** sector. Many years' effort culminated with the designation in 2003 of Sudan as free from rinderpest with the exception of Equatoria and eastern Upper Nile, which remained under active surveillance. As a result, Sudan was able to re-engage in livestock export.

15. **Water and sanitation** activities, critical to sustain the benefits of food security interventions, gave additional access to safe drinking water to an estimated 600,000 people. Since the start of 2004, an estimated additional 180,000 IDPs have also been provided with access to safe water and sanitation facilities.

16. The challenges of meeting basic **health** requirements (MDGs 4,5,6) in the Sudan (particularly but not only in the southern states) remained significant, but there were several notable achievements. The UN, NGOs and Sudanese authorities worked jointly on the Polio Eradication Initiative; no new cases of wild polio infection have been detected since April 2001. Vaccination and supplementation coverage widened with an estimated additional 70-80,000 children immunized, and 1.8 million provided with vitamin A supplements. Sub-national measles campaigns were successfully finalized.

17. But despite the undoubted benefits that flowed from these efforts, the needs of the people of the Sudan remained critical. In 2003, the *national* global **malnutrition** rate was a devastating 19%; in some conflict and drought affected areas, the rate reached as high as 40%<sup>6</sup>. 18% of children under five were estimated to be malnourished. About 670,000 children under the age of five died from preventable diseases over the past year. A woman's risk of dying from maternal causes was an appalling 1 in 12, compared to 1 in 130 in neighbouring Egypt. Preventable and eradicable diseases such as malaria and guinea worm continued to contribute to high mortality and morbidity.

18. There was slow but progressive increase in awareness of the threat from **HIV/AIDS**; Sudan agreed to participate in the global target of ensuring that three million people in developing countries have access to anti-retroviral treatment by the end of 2005. Voluntary Counselling and HIV/AIDS Testing (VCT) centres were opened in Juba, Yambio and Rumbek. Resources from the Global Fund were negotiated, in principle. However, the overall structure in Sudan for international assistance on HIV/AIDS was not necessarily optimally configured to energise the effort against this epidemic, with implications that may be considered by UNAIDS and partner agencies.

19. The past year also saw progress in **education** towards MDGs 2 and 3. Some 250-300,000 more children enrolled in primary school, including a significant number of girls. Since the start of 2004 alone, an additional 3,800 primary-age school children have been enrolled in Nuba Mountains, Kassala, West Darfur, Bahr El Ghazal and Upper Nile; an additional 800 teachers have been trained across North and West Kordofan, North and West Darfur, Bahr el Ghazal, Upper Nile, Kassala and Gedarif; and 147 girls' community schools were planned for completion. In another positive step for peace, 2000 SPLA child-soldiers were demobilized.

20. The ratification by the GoS of the **Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention** in October 2003 was an encouraging signal for human security. The SPLM/A also reaffirmed in September 2003 its Deed of Commitment for Non-State Actors, which it had originally signed in October 2001. This was accompanied by the clearance of some 200,000 square feet in the Nuba Mountains, enabling the first cross-line delivery of assistance. In an historical step forward that

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<sup>6</sup> Sudan Annual Needs Assessment (ANA) 2003-2004. The ANA is a collaborative report of the World Food Programme (WFP), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the Government of Sudan and Southern Sector Counterparts compiled by WFP in January 2004.

will have direct impact on assistance delivery, and facilitate the return of refugees and IDPs, the first mine-clearance activities outside of the Nuba Mountains began in March 2004: clearing and rebuilding of the main supply road into southern Sudan from Lokichoggio (northern Kenya) to Juba, via Kapoeta, Torit and Rumbek. Initial steps were taken to institutionalise these practical efforts, through joint planning between the GOS and SPLM who agreed to work on a joint national mines action policy and institutions. A *National Mine Action Authority* and *Regional Mine Action Centres* were initiated in both GoS and SPLM held areas.

21. Several **disasters** required concerted emergency responses. Emergency assistance was provided to 100,000 civilians who lost their homes and livelihoods due to the **flooding in Kassala** in July-August 2003. A major outbreak of **yellow fever in Equatoria** in May-August was successfully controlled by an inter-agency effort that vaccinated 225,000 people. These disasters and the Darfur crises were a practical test of the UN's emergency response mechanisms. The range of emergency instruments handled by OCHA, including the UNDAC system proved useful at the same time as providing lessons for improving speediness of response, flexibility, and quality of emergency personnel deployed. OCHA may wish to review all its different response mechanisms to make them even more useful. Some of the operational UN agencies found that they were considerably challenged by the need to react quickly including, in particular, finding and deploying suitable experts. They would benefit from examining their emergency response capacities and procedures, and strengthening them accordingly.

#### Human rights

22. The chronic neglect of human rights and governance issues—the necessary foundations for peaceful and lasting development - explains, in large part, the emergence of conflict in the west, and potentially in the east as well as other parts of the country. It also reveals why social and economic indicators for the Sudan are some of the lowest in the world. Serious **human rights violations**, linked to the **absence of appropriate governance** institutions and the general militarization of life in the Sudan, continued to have profound consequences for civilians including many at the receiving end of violence and various forms of degrading and inhuman treatment.

23. Despite the sensitivities, debate was stimulated on human rights and good governance and, though the Darfur conflict was a serious setback, the past year saw a **partial widening of political space**, and **expansion in civil society dialogue**. A special focus was given to **women's rights**, through the launching of a campaign against *fistula* and advocacy against *female genital mutilation*<sup>7</sup> (FGM): a regional Symposium on the Abolition of FGM was held in August 2003 at which the GoS endorsed an Action Plan to ban this harmful traditional practice afflicting an estimated 90% of women in many parts of the country. The systematic sexual violence in the Darfur conflict illustrated one aspect of the continued oppression of many women of Sudan.

24. The limited technical assistance mandate in the Sudan of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the special procedures of the Commission on Human Rights were particular constraints. A start was made to integrate human rights into the mainstream work of the UNCT but much more needs to be done, requiring considerably more human and financial resources than were available in practice. More generally, OHCHR continues to be challenged by the increasing requirement to become more operationally active in the field, and to set up the systems to do so. Our Sudan experience reinforces the conclusions and recommendations of my earlier report<sup>8</sup> on strengthening OHCHR's country-

<sup>7</sup> See RC/HC's address at closing ceremony of the Regional Experts Symposium on Effective Measures for the Abolition of female Genital Mutilation (FGM), Khartoum, 28 August 2003.

<sup>8</sup> "Enhancing OHCHR effectiveness to strengthen human rights at country level." Report by Mukesh Kapila, Special Adviser to Sergio Vieira de Mello, High Commissioner for Human Rights, February 2003.

level presences and operations, prepared in the context of the Secretary General's September 2002 report on *'Strengthening the UN : an agenda for further change'*.

### The violence in Darfur

25. Tragically, the conflict in Darfur between the GoS and its allied militia (Janjaweed), and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) have significantly offset progress in other parts of Sudan. A progressive increase in violence during 2003 peaked in early 2004 to become the world's greatest humanitarian and human rights catastrophe. A separate report<sup>9</sup> catalogues the war crimes and crimes against humanity that have characterised this conflict which has, with ample justification, come to be described as *ethnic cleansing*<sup>10</sup>.

26. The UN responded with a comprehensive package covering immediate humanitarian needs and proposals for peace-building, in our ***Greater Darfur Special Initiative***<sup>11</sup>. Humanitarian access and the protection of civilians became urgent imperatives, reflected in both private representations to the Government of Sudan and, when these had limited effect, in strong public advocacy and, ultimately, discussion in the UN Security Council. Between November 2003 and early February 2004, humanitarian access was largely denied. Somewhat increased access to the region was allowed from mid-February 2004, to which the UN responded by gearing up in-field staffing through redeploying staff from elsewhere and calling down external surge capacity from UNDAC and the International Humanitarian Partnership<sup>12</sup>. By the end of March 2004<sup>13</sup>, UN agencies and NGO partners had managed to supply some food assistance for 325,000 people, health supplies for over 560,000, shelter and non food assistance for about 200,000, and water and sanitation for 110,000 vulnerable persons. But despite these best-possible efforts, limited co-operation from the authorities which delayed or denied the deployment of essential personnel and equipment, and pervasive insecurity meant that access and assistance remained ad hoc. The suffering of the large numbers of displaced, and violence against them, continued to worsen.

### **ANTICIPATING THE PEACE**

27. At the same time as efforts to optimise the delivery of assistance including, latterly, for Darfur, the UN system sought to look ahead, in anticipation of the wider opportunities and challenges ahead, for the nation as a whole.

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<sup>9</sup> Report to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (April 2004): *Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan: Violations of Human Rights in the Greater Darfur Region, covering the period from 1 April 2003 to 31 March 2004*.

<sup>10</sup> See "Ethnic Cleansing, Again", by Nicholas D. Kristof, New York Times, Editorial, March 24, 2004.

<sup>11</sup> Initially launched in September 2003 with a request for US\$23m, and updated in March 2004, requesting US\$110m (not including refugees in Chad). By April, US\$131m in donor pledges had been registered, including US\$41m for refugees in Chad.

<sup>12</sup> The IHP is a multinational collaborative effort (Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, UK) to provide operational support, coordinated through OCHA, to the UN humanitarian system in major crises.

<sup>13</sup> See the regular sitreps and briefings put out by the Office of the RC/HC, available on [www.unsudanig.org](http://www.unsudanig.org)



28. Following positive consultations<sup>14</sup> with the Sudanese parties and the international community on a broad-based UN role in the implementation of the peace agreement, the **UN Security Council** issued a **Presidential Statement** in October 2003 calling on the Secretary-General to initiate preparatory work on a UN peace support role. The Secretary General established an **Inter-Departmental Task Force**, which met frequently over the following months, sent information-gathering and planning missions to Sudan and worked closely with the UN Country Team to produce a concept for a **potential Peace Support Operation**.

29. The UN Country Team, consisting of the heads of UN entities active in the Sudan, met weekly to provide general oversight of the planning, implementation, and review of UN programmes in line with commonly agreed policies, strategies, and delivery modalities. The long-standing legacy of mistrust between the Khartoum and Nairobi-based UN teams was overcome through fostering a *one-UN Sudan* approach, consistent with the broader principles of the United Nations. Communications between the north and south were greatly enhanced, including through an UNCT retreat – the first for several years that brought the north and south together. *Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS)* was encouraged to integrate closer into the wider UN structure, and the distinctions between OLS and non-OLS were discouraged through a more inclusive approach. Several UN agencies – previously active only in the North – were supported in opening new representation or strengthening existing presences in the South. In particular, UNDP re-established its presence in southern Sudan, after a gap of some 17 years, with new programmes in capacity building for governance, rule-of-law and recovery. Support was given to the World Bank to re-engage in Sudan after many years.

30. The **Office of the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator** received generous support from many donors<sup>15</sup> was significantly restructured, with several enhanced common services, reflecting a vision of co-ordination<sup>16</sup> as the provision of key services and facilities. A new meetings and offices complex with video-conferencing and other facilities were constructed and brought into service<sup>17</sup>. The principal innovation in the Office of the RC/HC was the fostering of a more *field-oriented culture* with the creation of an **Area Coordination Service** – with outposted staff in the major regions of the country - aimed at deepening contact and co-operation with local authorities and beneficiary populations, so as to better understand and serve their needs.

31. The **Information, Planning and Review Service** (including the UN Information Centre) in the Office of the RC/HC supported the formulation and updating of **common plans and appeals**, including the first consolidated humanitarian and transitional appeal, the *Appeal for the Sudan Assistance Programme (ASAP 2004)*. It also initiated the **Sudan Assistance Bulletin**, as the UN's combined newsletter, and established a new common **UN Sudan Information Gateway** website ([www.unsudanig.org](http://www.unsudanig.org)).

32. The **Partnerships Development Service** in the Office of the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator focused on streamlining and strengthening **coordination arrangements**, underpinned by a new **resource tracking system** which permitted a more accurate, real-time perspective on funding matters, including resource flows and gaps. Donor coordination, under the

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<sup>14</sup> During the year, several high level UN visitors made useful visits to Sudan to discuss current concerns, as well as the UN's future role. They included the UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, the SG's Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, the High Commissioner for Refugees, the SG's Special Representative for Least developed countries, Landlocked countries, and Small Island States, the SG's Special Envoy for Humanitarian Affairs for Sudan, and the SG's Representative for Internally Displaced People.

<sup>15</sup> Key donors to the Office of the RC/HC (with support channelled through UNDP and OCHA) included Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, UK-DFID, and USAID.

<sup>16</sup> The detailed coordination structure and systems was described in a comprehensive paper: *UN contribution to the coordination of international assistance in support of Sudanese counterparts and capacity building, (latest revised version 26 December 2003)*.

<sup>17</sup> Funded by the UK Department for International Development

aegis of the "IGAD Partners Forum", was given a boost by the landmark meeting in Noordwijk<sup>18</sup> in April 2003. Several new donors were encouraged to play a fuller role: a restructured UN **Donor Principals Group** met monthly in Khartoum to discuss policy and strategic issues of common concern while a UN/Donor meeting did the same in Nairobi. They were underpinned by **Working Groups** meeting fortnightly and progressing immediate issues of operational concern. NGOs participated in all these fora.

33. The Operational Support Service in the Office of the RC/HC offered practical guidance and assistance with **operational matters of common concern** such as premises and facilities (including refurbishing the UNDP-managed Juba compound and establishing a base in Rumbek), national staffing, and advice on contracting and procurement to obtain best value for money for goods and services needed by the various elements of the UN presence in the Sudan. A long standing grievance of Nairobi-based national staff on their pensions was settled and justice finally done, through granting them better fair conditions. OCHA and UNDP agreed an MOU to permit common terms of employment for field staff – with improvement in much-needed fairness and flexibility. The speed and responsiveness of HQ-set financial and personnel procedures was a challenge for OCHA, though progress was made.

34. The UN **Joint Logistics Centre** was established to strengthen the UN system's capacity to address emerging bottlenecks in humanitarian and transitional programming, as well as in response to the Darfur crisis. A **common telecoms policy** was also finally agreed, to be implemented in coming months.

### Security

35. A common approach to security was provided by UNSECOORD, operating as part of the Office of the RC/HC. Considerable effort was put into **progressing MOSS<sup>19</sup> compliance** through the development of procedures and training and in implementing the lessons learnt from the attack on the UN in Baghdad. This was very much work in progress – to address deep-rooted complacency in attitudes to risk management and to correct many years of under-investment. A key generalisable conclusion of our experience is that investment in security requires moving beyond business as usual ie. agencies need additional specific targeted resources, and should not be expected to finance such a crucial aspect, from the margins of their hard-pressed programmes. A more Sudan-specific comment from the Designated Official perspective is that separate security structures in northern and southern Sudan (for understandable historical reasons) justifies revision now into a unified structure to ensure that critical gaps do not recur.

### Displaced populations

36. Sudan has the world's largest number of internally displaced people; though reliable figures have not been available, these are estimated at 3-4 million (excluding the approx. 1 million "new" IDPs from the Darfur conflict). They are among the most vulnerable of the Sudanese, and how they are dealt with reflects on the state of Sudanese society, the challenges for the forthcoming peace, as well as on the adequacy of engagement by the international community. In 2003, an *IGAD Inter-Ministerial Conference on Internal Displacement* reviewed how best to respond to internal displacement in the IGAD region. Though the UN's Guiding Principles on IDPs were not fully accepted by the GoS, the spontaneous and increasing return movement of IDPs from the north to the south stimulated both Sudanese sides to give greater attention to this matter, and several meetings were held, under the auspices of the Office of the RC/HC to broker greater co-operation between the GoS and SPLM on this matter. This resulted in the formulation of a common policy, in principle. A **contingency emergency action plan** for UN assistance for 1 million returnees<sup>20</sup> in 2004 was

<sup>18</sup> Hosted by the Government of the Netherlands

<sup>19</sup> Minimum Operating Security Standards.

<sup>20</sup> Based on the principle of treating returning IDPs and refugees on an equitable basis.

also formulated. An inter-agency **Sustainable Return Team (SRT)** was created in the Office of the RC/HC in early 2004 to support spontaneous population returns, working in close partnership with Sudanese Authorities with Joint Operations Centres established in Khartoum and Rumbek.

37. The debate over IDPs in Sudan highlighted the wider issue of the optimal organisational arrangements. While the broad-based needs of IDPs require the engagement of all agencies, there are high transaction costs for interagency structures that can also be somewhat cumbersome in fast-moving humanitarian contexts. Thus, greater central direction would bring greater coherence and efficiency. This points towards either the strengthening of the IDP function in OCHA with a greater executive role and a greater volume of dedicated resources, or alternatively, a lead agency for IDPs in the UN system. In this context, the **protection needs of IDPs** would benefit from the transference of UNHCR's experience with refugee protection.

38. Recognizing the critical importance of establishing a coherent "common approach" as the basis for international support to **demilitarization, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)** efforts, our DDR Advisor<sup>21</sup> initiated, in October 2003, a set of very well-received consultations in both north and south.

39. A new dimension over the past year was on capacity building in the context of cross-line co-operation. This was based on the recognition that more needed to be done to foster Sudanese partnership (both GOS and SPLM) in ongoing humanitarian efforts and their ownership and leadership in planning for post-conflict recovery. Following the landmark meeting in Noordwijk, Netherlands, in April 2003, donor efforts supported by the UN led to the creation of the **Joint Planning Mechanism (JPM)**, and the Office of the RC/HC tasked to support its Joint Secretariat, located initially in Nairobi. As GOS/SPLM peace talks progressed, this evolved into the **Joint National Transition Team (JNTT)**, with a Core Coordination Group (CCG) consisting of senior representatives from both Sudanese sides, a representative of the IGAD Donors Group, World Bank, and the RC/HC on behalf of the UN system.

40. In parallel, the UN and World Bank, with the strong backing of key donors, supported the GoS and SPLM in the **Sudan Joint Assessment Mission (JAM)** process that started in late 2003. This intended to provide an assessment of rehabilitation and transitional recovery needs focused on the first two years of the post-peace agreement Interim Period, and outline a framework for reconstruction and recovery over the full Interim Period, based on progressing toward the MDGs. Until the signature of a comprehensive peace agreement, the JAM preparatory phase plans to conduct preliminary sectoral work, information gathering, and the identification of immediate "quick wins" requirements. The JAM was anticipated to intensify and scale up in preparation for an International Donors' Conference (Norway has offered to host this) after the peace agreement.<sup>22</sup> The JAM process has been time-consuming and often confusing to stakeholders. This reflected the evolution of the 'wider context' of Sudan, and the desirable requirement to keep everyone on board. Informally, the JAM was also seen as an exercise in confidence-building between the two Sudanese sides and, thus, a political as well as a technical venture. Meanwhile, the World Bank and UN (through UNDP) progressed dialogue with Sudanese counterparts in preparation of an **Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP)**. The I-PRSP, which will eventually lead to a full PRSP, is crucial to the resumption of assistance from the International Financial Institutions and many bilateral development donors.

41. Recognising that these plans for the transition from war-to-peace required robust co-ordinated financing arrangements to sustain them, a **Transition Funding Modality (TFM)** was established in early 2004 to finance capacity building, quick start and other relevant activities

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<sup>21</sup> The Advisor, retained on a DFID contract, is assigned as a Resource Person to support negotiations on Security Arrangements at the IGAD sponsored Peace Talks, and additionally as an advisor on DDR Programming to the United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan.

<sup>22</sup> For more information regarding the JAM, please visit: [www.unsudanig.org/JAM](http://www.unsudanig.org/JAM) (login: JAM; password: Sudan [case sensitive]).

until the end of the pre-interim period. The Transition Funding Modality (TFM) involves a **Capacity Building Trust Fund (CBTF)** for SPLM areas and a **Transition Recovery Trust Fund (TRTF)** for GoS areas.

### Resourcing

42. The Interagency Consolidated *Appeal*<sup>23</sup> for the Sudan Assistance Programme for 2004, initially sought US\$ 465 million for 3.5 million vulnerable Sudanese people. This was revised in March to US\$ 643 million for nearly 200 programmes and projects of UN agencies, IOM, and NGOs, taking into account the additional needs of a further 1.5 million people for which special sub-appeals were formulated: the *Greater Darfur Special Initiative: March 2004 Update*<sup>24</sup> requested US\$ 110 million, and the *Emergency Population Returns Programme*<sup>25</sup> requested US\$ 145 million.

43. Compared to recent years donors<sup>26</sup> were more responsive. For 2003, **overall funding** received for the Sudan reached an estimated US\$ 383 million, with some 74% of CAP requirements duly resourced. This was a significant improvement over previous recent years. For 2004, some US\$ 95 million in new donor resources had been committed by the end of March - nearly 50% greater than the total for the comparable period of the previous year. "But this welcome trend needs to be seen in the context of Sudan's expanded humanitarian needs and the new requirements of post-conflict recovery and essential capacity building to sustain the expected peace agreement.

44. **Resource mobilisation** required considerable effort, and the RC/HC visited several donor capitals<sup>27</sup> as part of a systematic effort to increase awareness among policy makers there, as well as their media and public. An attempt was made to put this in the context of the **good humanitarian donorship initiative**<sup>28</sup> with Sudan as a model case study. Several related issues merit comment. First, our efforts were greatly helped by setting up a dedicated resource tracking system<sup>29</sup> which allowed greater real-time analysis of trends and gaps, guiding advocacy accordingly with greater precision. Second, by combining the tracking of humanitarian flows, inside and outside CAP, and all other types of funding into a single system, a more **comprehensive overview** could be created, valued alike by Sudanese counterparts and donors for bringing transparency. This approach may be helpful to OCHA's global resource tracking system for CAP, as part of the wider efforts to refine the CAP process.

## **CONCLUSION**

45. Though the dynamics of conflict in the Sudan are complex, its effects have been clear. For almost two decades, conflict has compounded existing poverty and vulnerability caused by years of neglected development, poor governance and recurring natural calamities. As such, an end to conflict *throughout the Sudan* will have significant implications for improving the lives and livelihoods of all Sudanese people.

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<sup>23</sup> Launched in Brussels in November 2003, hosted by the European Commission/ ECHO

<sup>24</sup> Continuously update needs for Darfur are presented separately in the *Greater Darfur Special Initiative (GDSI): March 2004 Update* and subsequent documents. The full document and its successors can be downloaded from: [www.unsudanig.org](http://www.unsudanig.org).

<sup>25</sup> Continuously updated needs in support of returning populations are also presented separately in the *Emergency Population Returns Program (EPRP): March 2004*. The full document and its successors can be downloaded from: [www.unsudanig.org](http://www.unsudanig.org).

<sup>26</sup> The US, EC, and UK were the largest contributors contributing around 50% of recorded funding, with the balance provided by a dozen other donors.

<sup>27</sup> Brussels, Copenhagen, The Hague, London, Oslo, Ottawa, Paris, Rome, Stockholm, Washington DC, as well as the Arab League in Cairo.

<sup>28</sup> The RC/HC gave one of the keynote presentations ("*Putting the HUMAN back in humanitarian*") at the International Meeting on Good Humanitarian Donorship in Stockholm on 16-17 June 2003.

<sup>29</sup> Regular updates are available from the Office of the RC/HC on [www.unsudanig.org](http://www.unsudanig.org).

46. At this critical stage in the Sudan's history, the gains of the peace process between the GoS and SPLM risk being seriously offset by the Darfur conflict with its grave humanitarian and human rights consequences. While this is addressed, the UN system has an opportunity, functioning in the spirit of one-UN approach, and building on the innovations of past months, to work effectively with its Sudanese counterparts and international partners to make a significant practical contribution in both continued humanitarian work, and in recovery and peace-building.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

47. It was an enormous privilege to serve as the UN Coordinator for the Sudan at such a historic moment in the life of this great nation. I am grateful to the many Sudanese, from official and private walks of life, in all parts of Sudan, and across the conflictual divide, for the warmth of their welcome. Although, on some issues such as on human rights (including, especially women's rights), and latterly on Darfur, there were profound publicly-expressed disagreements, with some Government representatives in Khartoum, there was much more on which we shared a common aspiration for peace and development for all Sudan. In view of their sensitive position, it would not be prudent to name the several Sudanese colleagues (in both GOS and SPLM/A) that I would have liked to acknowledge, in particular, for their encouragement and support during many difficult times.

48. I would also like to thank many donor and NGO colleagues in both Khartoum and Nairobi, and at their head offices, for their political, financial and practical backing.

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